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Section 31 of Quine’s Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising 
argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth 
and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief 
contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over 
the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this 
paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad 
presentation on Quine’s part.  
 







Section 31 of Quine’s Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising 
argument. The argument purports to show that if an agent, Tom, believes 
one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief 
contexts are always transparent (what this comes to is explained at the 
beginning of Section 1, but the basic idea will already be familiar to many 
readers), then Tom believes everything. Quine’s larger aim with this 
argument was to show that we cannot always treat belief contexts as 
transparent. 
 
Philosophers have debated this argument over the decades, inconclusively. 
A perceptive but not fully adequate objection appeared in Sleigh (1966). 
Widerker (1977) and Sayward (2007) levelled criticisms at Sleigh’s 
objection which have not been properly assessed. Thus, the overall 
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impression one may get from the literature on this argument is that it was 
questioned at one time (by Sleigh) but then vindicated (by Widerker and 
Sayward). This impression is mistaken. My aim in this paper is to sort this 
out and attain a better view of the status of Quine’s provocative argument 
and what might be objectionable about it.  
 
To anticipate, the view I will propose regarding this argument is as follows. 
Quine here had all the makings of a perspicuous argument which does 
indeed lead to the desired conclusion that belief contexts cannot always be 
treated as transparent. But he instead presented a provocative argument for 
a very striking conclusion, the sort of conclusion that makes one think 
“How could that be?”, out of which then falls the desired bigger-picture 
conclusion that belief contexts cannot always be treated as transparent. 
 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 1 I present Quine’s 
argument. In Section 2 I present Sleigh’s objection. In Section 3 I consider 
Sayward’s objection to Sleigh’s objection and argue that it fails. In Section 
4 I consider Widerker’s objection, granting him a point against Sleigh but 
suggesting that his main point is suspect. I end in Section 5 by showing 
how Quine could have argued. Widerker will turn out to be right in his 
basic idea that Quine’s argument can be modified to yield a better 
argument, although the modification is not the one proposed by Widerker. 




1. Quine’s Argument 
 
Before we proceed to Quine’s argument, let us rehearse Quine’s definition 
of referential transparency. (Familiar readers can skip this and the 
following paragraph.) Quine defines transparency in terms of “modes of 
containment ... of singular terms or sentences in singular terms or 
sentences”. Definite descriptions count here as singular terms. For Quine, 
a mode of containment φ is referentially transparent iff, “whenever an 
occurrence of a singular term t is purely referential in a term or sentence 
ψ(t), it is purely referential also in the containing term or sentence φ(ψ(t))” 
(Quine 1960, 144). For a singular term t to be purely referential in a term 
or sentence is for it to occupy a purely referential position there. Quine’s 
criterion for a position’s being purely referential is that the position “must 
be subject to the substitutivity of identity” (Quine 1960, 142). 
 
To explain with an example: the occurrence of “John” in the statement 
“John is happy” is purely referential, since substituting another term which 
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refers to the same person could not turn this statement from true to false or 
from false to true. Now consider the mode of containment “It is true that 
…”. This mode of containment seems to be referentially transparent (or 
just “transparent” for short), since “John” in “It is true that John is happy” 
seems purely referential just as in “John is happy”. By contrast, it is 
doubtful whether a mode of containment such as “Lois Lane believes that 
…” may always be regarded as transparent. After all, we may happily grant 
that Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly but deny, or at least hesitate 
to affirm, that Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly. Quine here wants 
to vindicate this doubt, by arguing that such modes of containment - belief 
contexts - cannot always be regarded as transparent. 
 
Now, Quine assumes that Tom believes the true sentence “Cicero 
denounced Catiline” and the false sentence “Tully did not denounce 
Catiline”. That these sentences are (in a sense) contradictories, and that 
they are about the same person, is not essential for Quine’s argument. 
These things were needed for earlier, separate arguments in chapter IV of 
Word and Object. 
 
Here is the argument: 
 
Where “p” represents a sentence, let us write “δp” (following 
Kronecker) as short for the description:  
 
 the number x such that ((x = 1) and p) or ((x = 0) and not p).  
 
We may suppose that poor Tom, whatever his limitations regarding 
Latin literature and local philanthropies, is enough of a logician to 
believe a sentence of the form “δp = 1” when and only when he 
believes the sentence represented by “p”. But then we can argue 
from the transparency of belief that he believes everything. For, by 
the hypothesis already before us,  
 
 (3) Tom believes that δ(Cicero denounced Catiline) = 1. 
 
But, whenever “p” represents a true sentence,  
     
 δp = δ(Cicero denounced Catiline).  
 
But then, by (3) and the transparency of belief, 
 
 Tom believes that δp  = 1, 
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from which it follows, by the hypothesis about Tom’s logical 
acumen, that 
 
 (4) Tom believes that p.  
 
But “p” represented any true sentence. Repeating the argument 
using the falsehood “Tully did not denounce Catiline” instead of the 
truth “Cicero denounced Catiline”, we establish (4) also where “p” 




2. Sleigh’s Objection  
 
Sleigh’s objection to the above argument takes the form of a dilemma 
concerning the interpretation of Quine’s hypothesis about Tom’s logical 
acumen. In Sleigh’s reconstruction of Quine’s argument, the hypothesis 
runs as follows: 
 
(AmbigAcumen) Tom believes that δp = 1 if and only if Tom believes p. 
(Sleigh 1966, 92) 
 
(The label is my own – Sleigh dubs it “(4)”. I do not know if Sleigh had a 
reason for omitting “that” before the “p” at the end or if it was just a slip.) 
 
Sleigh notes that, intuitively, (AmbigAcumen) is ambiguous between a 
transparent and an opaque reading. The crux of his objection is contained 
in the following passage1: 
 
But [(AmbigAcumen)] asserts the relevant acumen of Tom only if 
“δp” in [(AmbigAcumen)] is taken opaquely, in which case the 
argument is simply invalid. Obviously, [a transparent disambiguation 
of (AmbigAcumen)] does not express the idea of Tom’s acumen.2 
(Sleigh 1966, 93) 
 
In other words, either we understand (AmbigAcumen) transparently, in 
which case it is obviously not something which would hold of Tom in 
                                                 
1 The square brackets contain replacements, more convenient for present purposes, for 
Sleigh’s labels. 
2 You may notice that Sleigh talks of a referring term, rather than a context (or “mode of 
containment”), as being opaque, and locates the ambiguity there. Locating the ambiguity in 
the mode of containment “believes (...)” arguably makes more sense, and certainly fits 
better with Quine’s official terminology – but that is a minor quibble which does not matter 
for our purposes. 
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virtue of any logical acumen he may have, or we understand it opaquely, 
in which case it cannot be used in Quine’s argument. 
 
A further point Sleigh could have made here is that, unlike 
(AmbigAcumen) as reformulated by Sleigh using that-clauses, Quine’s 
original formulation of his hypothesis about poor Tom’s acumen is put in 
terms of sentences. (Recall, Quine writes “We may suppose that poor Tom, 
whatever his limitations regarding Latin literature and local philanthropies, 
is enough of a logician to believe a sentence of the form “δ p = 1” when 
and only when he believes the sentence represented by ‘p’”.) This all but 
ensures an opaque reading. 
 
 
3. Sayward’s Objection to Sleigh’s Objection 
 
Sayward objects to Sleigh’s objection on the grounds that Sleigh has not 
argued for the claim that (AmbigAcumen) read transparently does not 
express the idea of Tom’s acumen. When discussing Quine’s argument, 
Sayward uses a construction involving sets in place of Quine’s one 
involving numbers, but the essential thing is that, like Sleigh, he uses 
notation to disambiguate (AmbigAcumen) (writing “BELIEVES” for the 
transparent reading and “believes” for the opaque). We will abstract from 
the distracting details by simply using the names “(TransparentAcumen)” 
and “(OpaqueAcumen)”. 
 
What Quine supposed about poor Tom’s logical acumen was, 








But apart from that point—a point of how to interpret the biconditionals 
which occur in the argument as premises—Sleigh offers no objection. 
 
Now, the interesting question is not whether the type of logical acumen 
of which Quine spoke is expressed by [(TransparentAcumen)] but 
whether there is any logical acumen fairly broadly shared among us 
which is expressed by that sentence. (...) 
 
So if Sleigh’s point is to carry much weight it must take the form of 
a claim that no logical acumen, or at least none at all widely shared, 
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is expressed by [(TransparentAcumen)]. But so far as I can see that 
simply goes unargued in his paper. Indeed, so far as I can see the 
paper contains no argument that the logical acumen to which Quine 
referred is not expressed by [(TransparentAcumen)]. It is simply and 
baldly asserted. (Sayward 2007, 57-58) 
 
This objection can be convincingly rebutted. Firstly, it gets the dialectic 
wrong. Quine, for his argument to be plausible, needs his hypothesis about 
Tom’s logical acumen to be about some genuine, plausible kind of logical 
acumen. It is perfectly fair to point out that this only seems to be so if we 
take the hypothesis opaquely, in which case it doesn’t support the 
argument. That is already a good objection, without a further argument that 
it is not the case that (TransparentAcumen) does express logical acumen 
after all. 
 
But there is a much stronger response to be made to Sayward’s objection 
to Sleigh’s objection: Sleigh does give an argument that no logical acumen 
is expressed by (TransparentAcumen)! Sayward’s claim that he does not 
do so is a sheer mistake.  It is true that Sleigh prefaces his claim that no 
logical acumen is expressed by (TransparentAcumen) with “Obviously”, 
but he does not leave the matter there. He goes on to argue for what he has 
claimed is obviously the case. The argument comes at the end of his note 
and runs as follows (I have, for ease of reading, removed the subscript 
notation which he applies to singular terms to disambiguate between 
transparent and opaque, and simply put bracketed specifications of the 
intended reading next to “believes” instead): 
 
Obviously, (4’) does not express the idea of Tom’s acumen. 
Consider: 
 




(10) Tom believes [opaque] that [2-1] = 1. 
 
Given (10), (9) is true provided the sentence represented by “p” is 
true. But we cannot infer from this that Tom believes the sentence 
represented by “p” even if every singular term in “p” is taken 
transparently and even if Tom is overflowing with logical acumen. 
(Sleigh 1966, 93) 
 
Clearly, this is an argument – so Sayward is just wrong in saying that 
Sleigh doesn’t offer one. It seems to be a perfectly good argument, too – 
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although I think it was unnecessary to make “believes” in (10) opaque, and 
as will become clear, this makes Sleigh more vulnerable to Widerker’s 
criticism, which we will consider in the next section. 
 
Finally, in case there is any remaining doubt, here is another argument that 
(TransparentAcumen) does not express any sort of logical acumen. We can 
express (TransparentAcumen) as follows: 
 
(TransparentAcumen) Tom believes [transparent] that δp = 1 when and 
only when he believes [transparent] that p. 
 
Now, let us plug in some truth for “p” which not everyone with logical 
acumen knows – say, “Quine was born in 1908”: 
 
Tom believes [transparent] that δ(Quine was born in 1908) = 1 when and 
only when he believes [transparent] that Quine was born in 1908. 
 
Now, substituting “1” for the co-extensive “δ(Quine was born in 1908)”, 
we get 
 
Tom believes [transparent] that 1 = 1 when and only when he believes 
[transparent] that Quine was born in 1908. 
 
This is plainly not something we should require of a reasoner. Using “of” 
to induce a transparent reading, so that the point reads more intuitively: a 
reasoner may fail to believe, of Quine, that he was born in 1908. They may 
not have any beliefs about Quine at all. Obviously, they should not in that 
case – by the “only when”, which is essential to Quine’s argument – fail to 
believe, of 1, that it is equal to 1. But we obtained this wrong result just by 
substituting co-extensive terms in an instance of (TransparentAcumen). 
Therefore (TransparentAcumen) does not express any sort of logical 
acumen. Rather, it seems like something we definitely shouldn’t conform 




4. Widerker’s Objection to Sleigh’s Objection 
 
At the heart of Widerker’s objection to Sleigh’s objection is the 
observation that Quine is arguing, not that the assumption that there are 
transparent belief contexts leads to absurdity, but that the assumption that 
belief contexts are invariably transparent leads to absurdity. It is hard to 
deny that Widerker is right about this interpretative point. Widerker quotes 
Quine’s summary of the lesson of his argument: 
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Thus in declaring belief invariably transparent ... we would let in too 
much. (Quine 1960, 135) 
 
And draws attention to the last two sentences of Sleigh’s article: 
 
That the transparent sense of belief is odd is beyond doubt. That it 
is as odd as Quine suggests does seem doubtful. (Sleigh 1966, 93) 
 
Widerker suggests that 
 
[Sleigh’s] criticism of Quine stems from the fact that he interprets 
Quine’s argument as being directed against the intelligibility of the 
transparent sense of belief. However that’s not the case. Quine uses 
his argument only to show that the transparent sense can’t be the 
only sense appropriate for the analysis of belief contexts. In other 
words, Quine is not arguing against the transparent sense of belief 
as such, but against the attempt to treat all belief contexts 
transparently. (Widerker 1977, 357) 
 
What I will now argue is that, while it is a fair point that Sleigh does seem 
to interpret Quine’s argument as Widerker says he does, and that this isn’t 
correct, the core of Sleigh’s objection still applies.3 
 
Unlike Sayward, Widerker allows that (TransparentAcumen) does not 
actually capture any logical acumen. This can be seen from this passage from 
a footnote occurring in Widerker’s diagnosis of Sleigh’s misinterpretation:  
 
If Quine would be arguing against the transparent sense of belief 
alone, then indeed Sleigh’s charge would be correct because in such 
a case Quine would be arguing from a premise (that about Tom’s 
logical acumen) which is not captured adequately by the transparent 
sense of belief. (Widerker 1977, 358, fn. 7) 
 
His criticism is this: once we recognize that Quine is arguing on the 
assumption that all belief contexts are transparent, then the needed 
(TransparentAcumen) follows from (AmbigAcumen), allowing Quine’s 
argument - supposing it is not quite right, or unfortunately enthymematic, 
as it stands - to be easily patched up: 
                                                 
3 If I am right, Widerker’s claim that Sleigh’s objection stems from his misinterpretation is 
also doubtful – though this causal question about Sleigh’s thought process is not important 
for my purposes in this paper. 
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It is not difficult, however, to meet this objection. We may certainly 
agree with Sleigh that a valid derivation of [the conclusion that Tom 
believes any arbitrary truth4] rests on [(TransparentAcumen)] and 
that it can’t be identified with [(AmbigAcumen)], but nevertheless 
[(TransparentAcumen)] follows from [(AmbigAcumen)] given the 
assumption that all belief contexts are transparent. (Widerker 1977, 
356) 
 
One problem with this is that the acumen hypothesis in Quine’s original 
argument is not (AmbigAcumen), but is put in terms of belief in sentences, 
which, as I noted at the end of Section 2, all but ensures an opaque reading. 
But there is, I think, a deeper problem with this defense of Quine’s 
argument. The defense trades on a subtly objectionable handling of the idea 
of what follows from an ambiguous statement. I will try to bring this out 
with an analogy. Consider the ambiguity of “bank” in English, whereby it 
may mean either a money bank or a river bank. Now consider the following 
argument: 
 
Suppose John has some money, and suppose that he has enough 
civic common sense to put it in the bank. Now, suppose that “bank” 
in English always meant a river bank. In that case John’s money is 
in a river bank. 
 
I submit that there is something objectionable about this argument, and that 
it is objectionable in a way analogous to Quine’s argument. Furthermore, 
suppose we discharge the assumptions and outline the putative lesson of 
the argument as follows:  
 
If John has some money and a certain basic kind of civic common 
sense, and if “bank” always means a river bank, then John’s money 
is in a river bank. 
 
This is an objectionable statement, objectionable in a way analogous to the 
putative lesson of Quine’s argument. 
 
Now let us consider an objection to the bank argument analogous to 
Sleigh’s objection to Quine’s argument: 
 
                                                 
4 Widerker notes that his reconstructed argument can be repeated with any arbitrary falsity. 
Thus putting two iterations of the argument together yields the conclusion that Tom 
believes everything. 
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For the assumption about John’s civic common sense to be about 
something which plausibly does constitute civic common sense, 
“bank” needs to be given its money bank reading, but for it to lead 
to the conclusion that John’s money is in a river bank, “bank” needs 
to be given its river bank reading. 
 
I think this objection, like Sleigh’s, is quite compelling. Now let us 
consider a criticism of this Sleigh-style objection to the bank argument 
analogous to Widerker’s criticism of Sleigh’s objection: 
 
It is not difficult to meet this objection. We may certainly agree that 
the conclusion that John’s money is in a river bank rests on the river-
bank reading of the ambiguous claim that John’s money is in a bank, 
but it does follow from that ambiguous claim given the assumption 
that “bank” always means a river bank. 
 
This seems dubious. If a claim is ambiguous between two readings, some 
things will follow from it on one reading, and some things will follow from 
it on another. You can’t treat it as a thing which can be combined with an 
assumption (“bank” always means a river bank), whose truth would make 
one of the readings impossible, to yield the consequences of the other 
reading. 
 
But what am I saying? Maybe you can so treat an ambiguous claim. (After 
all, what would stop you?) Perhaps the point is that you shouldn’t, for if 
you do you get dubious results which may impress some but which make 
others - such as Sleigh and myself - want to object. 
 
At this point it becomes important to note, something which Sleigh did not, 
that in both the belief case and the bank case, we do have before us all that 
we need to argue for the desired linguistic conclusions. All this tussling 
over Quine’s argument really has no bearing on whether or not you can 
show that not all belief contexts are transparent; the fundamental problem 
with Quine’s argument is more of a matter of presentation than it may 




5. How Quine Could Have Argued 
 
Instead of trading on an ambiguity, by baiting us with the plausible reading 
of an ambiguous assumption and then switching to its implausible reading 
in order to deliver a striking, paradoxical conclusion, Quine could have 
argued as follows: 





(1) There is a reading of (AmbigAcumen) which does express some 
logical acumen. 
 
Now, suppose for the sake of argument that 
 
(2) All belief contexts are transparent. 
 
In that case, (AmbigAcumen) would unambiguously amount to (TransparentAcumen), 
and if Tom conformed to that, and if he believed one truth and one falsity, 
he would believe everything (as Quine’s manipulations with the “δ” device 
show). But this is absurd, and so, by (1), (2) cannot be the case. Q.E.D.  
 
Presenting things perspicuously, we can see that the real engine of Quine’s 
argument - the series of manipulations with the “δ” device - is actually just 
another argument that (TransparentAcumen) doesn’t express any sort of 
logical acumen. I.e., that which Sayward, who was trying to defend 
Quine’s argument, mistakenly claimed that Sleigh had not provided, and 
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